Sven Riemann
Head of Marketing Services Marketing Services
+44 (0)20 7976 4158 mail@ahk-london.co.uk
The global economy remained robust in the third quarter of 2025. In the United States, GDP is likely to have grown markedly again despite the higher import tariffs. In China, by contrast, economic activity weakened somewhat. This was mainly due to weaker domestic demand, whilst exports remained fairly buoyant. In the euro area, economic activity grew slightly again. Overall, the global economy proved resilient to the burdens arising from trade disputes.
Global trade in goods also held up well overall in the summer months, despite the sharply risen US tariffs. Nevertheless, there were marked changes in the regional structure of global trade. US foreign trade, which accounted for around 14 % of global imports of goods in 2024, was impacted to a considerable degree by the restrictive trade policy. In particular, imports to the United States from China fell substantially in comparison with the start of the year. Outside of the United States, international trade in goods remained buoyant. It remains to be seen whether the burdens arising from trade policy disputes will have a greater impact on global trade over the remainder of the year.
International trade policy continued to be characterised by considerable unease. The US administration pushed ahead with its trade policy agenda. Various sector-specific tariff rates were increased. At the same time, the US administration reached framework agreements for future trade relations with other, predominantly Asian countries. As in previous negotiations, the United States was able to gain concessions from its partners. There was a certain degree of de-escalation in the trade dispute between the United States and China. Both parties agreed on moderate reductions in tariffs as well as additional relief measures. Prior to this, both sides had exchanged significant threats. In particular, potential restrictions on the export of rare earths by China would have also entailed considerable risks for the European economy. However, even after the agreement between the United States and China, the risk of renewed escalation remains.
Real gross domestic product (GDP) is likely to flatten at best in the third quarter of 2025. Industry is continuing to suffer due not only to structural problems, but also raised US tariffs. Output, real sales and real exports of goods saw a decline recently. The same is now also true for industrial new orders. Moreover, the still low level of capacity utilisation in industry and weak competitiveness probably continued to weigh on investment activity and thus on demand for capital goods. Standing somewhat in contrast to this, however, is the improvement in short-term production expectations and, above all, export expectations in September reported by the ifo Institute. A broad-based recovery is likewise still to materialise in the construction sector. Construction output rose slightly averaged across July and August. The increase was attributable solely to the finishing trades, though, whilst output in building construction and civil engineering was lower. The situation in civil engineering is still significantly better than in building construction. Private consumption is likely to have registered a slight increase at most. Activity in the services sector was likewise sluggish. Service providers’ output declined slightly in July and the business situation of consumer-related service providers deteriorated in the third quarter, according to surveys conducted by the ifo Institute. However, the S&P Global Purchasing Managers’ Index remained just above the expansion threshold in the services sector.
The German economy is proving relatively robust in a difficult environment. Overall, from today’s perspective, real gross domestic product (GDP) could increase slightly in the third quarter of 2025. Investment conditions for firms remain unfavourable amid weak competitiveness and low capacity utilisation. However, there are no signs of any major setback for industry in the third quarter, despite additional burdens caused by the new US tariffs. On the contrary, it could even make a positive contribution to GDP growth. Industrial output rose steeply in July after seasonal adjustment. Price-adjusted sales increased significantly as well. As this noticeably good start to the quarter is based on notable developments in the case of the mechanical engineering sector and car manufacturers, it is unlikely to be sustained. However, combined with the leading indicators, it suggests that output will increase on a quarterly average. In fact, the underlying trend in new orders is still pointing upwards. In addition, following the preliminary trade agreement between the United States and the EU, survey indicators showed signs of a slowdown in August, but remained relatively robust overall. Exports to the United States are unlikely to weigh as heavily as in the second quarter. These had risen sharply in the first quarter ahead of the introduction of US tariffs in April and then plummeted. A recovery is yet to materialise in the construction sector. Financing conditions remained stable and demand is tending to increase. However, improved demand is not yet reflected in higher output. Private consumption is likely to rise slightly, if at all. The labour market is not currently providing any stronger stimulus in the form of rising employment, and the strong wage growth so far is likely to tail off. There are signs of a sideways movement in the services sector (excluding trade). According to the ifo Institute, businesses believe their current business situation to be worse averaged across July and August than in the previous quarter, but they were more optimistic looking ahead.
The second quarter of 2025 once again saw the global economy in robust shape. US gross domestic product (GDP) rose significantly in the second quarter after having fallen slightly at the start of the year. The Chinese economy recorded similar growth to the first quarter despite the higher tariffs imposed by the United States. GDP in the euro area increased again slightly in the second quarter following the strong start to the year. The global economy appears so far to have been able to withstand the tougher and in part erratic US trade policy. This resilience was supported by the short-term front-loading and diversion of trade flows.
Looking ahead, however, the United States’ erratic, protectionist trade policy is likely to place more of a strain on the global economy. In the year to date, the average tariff rate imposed by the United States on all its trading partners has climbed by more than 14 percentage points, reaching its highest level since the 1930s. A deal with the United States’ most important trading partner, China, is still pending, however. Given the in part erratic US tariff policy, the risk of an escalation of the trade disputes persists. This and the tariff hikes that have already been adopted are likely to place a mounting strain on global trade. Overall, the trade policy concessions made by some partner countries of the United States are too insignificant to offset the adverse effects of additional US tariffs on global trade. Global trade activity was already sharply lower in April and May, after US imports in particular had previously risen sharply in anticipation of tariff hikes. In addition to the unwinding of these front-loading effects, the initial dampening impact of the increased tariffs on demand from the United States became apparent. The medium-term outlook for global trade will depend on whether further countries give in to the temptations of protectionism and likewise seal themselves off more.
Lapsing anticipatory effects contributed to the fact that seasonally adjusted real gross domestic product (GDP) probably stagnated in the second quarter. In anticipation of higher tariffs, Germany’s industrial output and exports had risen significantly in the first quarter. In the second quarter, some US import tariffs on German goods and services were suspended, while future tariff levels remained unclear. However, it can be assumed that the high level of activity normalised somewhat compared with the previous quarter. Averaged across April and May, real exports of goods stagnated quarter on quarter. Meanwhile, industrial output also expanded with somewhat less momentum. Moreover, in the second quarter, the services sector likely expanded its activity slightly at best, partly because households’ propensity to save probably did not decline any further and private consumption therefore provided less impetus. The construction sector is expected to make a significantly negative contribution to growth.
The underlying basic trend remains weak overall. Domestic and foreign demand for German industrial products picked up somewhat but is still weak. Low capacity utilisation in industry continues to weigh on firms’ propensity to invest. Business sentiment did improve in June. In particular, business expectations as surveyed by the ifo Institute brightened. In addition, the S&P Global Purchasing Managers’ Index for June rose just above the expansion threshold again. However, this may partly reflect expectations about the impact of the more expansionary fiscal stance. Its impact on economic output is expected only with a delay, though. US tariff policy threatens to bring additional headwinds to German exporters in the short term. In particular, US President Trump recently announced that additional tariffs of 30 % (in place of the baseline 10 % tariff introduced in April) on products imported from the EU will enter into force from 1 August 2025 if no agreement is reached before that date. In the June Forecast for Germany, the Bundesbank had still assumed a tariff rate of 10 % for the baseline. If the newly announced tariff rate takes effect, it would thus represent a considerable downside risk to the economy. With regard to the adverse risk scenario also outlined in the June Forecast for Germany, however, two things should be noted. On the one hand, it only assumed an additional tariff rate of 20 % for EU exports. On the other hand, it assumed other factors that would act as a drag, such as reciprocal EU tariffs of the same amount, once again very high tariffs between the United States and China, and persistently high uncertainty as well as strong financial market reactions. The extent to which these factors will become relevant is currently unclear.
The recovery of the German economy is being delayed by the turmoil caused by international trade policy. Only gradually will economic activity be boosted by additional fiscal measures.
The new US tariffs and the uncertainty surrounding US policy are set to weigh on economic growth both this year and the next. In connection with this, the rise in GDP will be weakened by the imposed tariffs themselves and the associated general uncertainty. By the end of 2027, macroeconomic growth is estimated to be around ¾ percentage point lower solely on account of these factors.
From next year onwards, the expansionary fiscal policy stance will contribute to the significant economic recovery that is set to begin then. The demand effects from increased defence and infrastructure spending are estimated to support the cumulative increase in GDP by ¾ percentage point over the forecast horizon. The general government deficit ratio will rise to just over 4 % by 2027, partly owing to other measures. In the wake of strong growth in spending by the social security fund, contribution rates will rise steeply.
Overall, real GDP in 2025 is likely to tread water in calendar-adjusted terms, but will then see strong growth again, at 0.7 % in 2026 and 1.2 % in 2027. In view of this, the growth outlook has mainly been revised downwards for 2025 and upwards for 2027 relative to last December’s Forecast for Germany.
The inflation rate as measured by the HICP will fall to 2.2 % this year before temporarily dropping to 1.5 % in 2026 and rising again to 1.9 % in 2027. The temporarily lower inflation rate in the coming year will be driven by lower energy commodity prices and the appreciation of the euro against the US dollar as well as directly energy price-lowering fiscal measures. Core HICP inflation (excluding energy and food) will stabilise around 2 % from 2026 onwards.
The inflation outlook for 2025 and 2026 has thus been revised significantly downwards compared to the Forecast for Germany from last December.
The outlook around this baseline is shaped by major uncertainties surrounding trade disputes, geopolitical conflicts and the specifics of German fiscal policy. There are risks to economic growth and inflation in both directions.
The global economy was still in robust shape at the start of 2025. Anticipatory effects resulting from expectations of further US tariffs even appear to have stimulated global trade and industrial production temporarily. This is likely to be one reason why economic output in the euro area increased markedly in the last quarter. In China, the pace of growth remained solid at first. In the United States, while real gross domestic product (GDP) decreased slightly against a backdrop of a sharp upturn in imports, other indicators did not yet point to a significant deterioration in economic activity.
From the second quarter onwards, the US’s pivot towards protectionist trade policy is likely to weigh increasingly on the global economy. Uncertainty over trade policy had already risen significantly in the aftermath of the election of the new US President. At the start of 2025, the new US administration then began to impose the first additional tariffs on imports from various countries. Further tariff increases followed. Trading partners resorted to retaliatory measures in some cases. Some of the tariff increases were then withdrawn. In trade between the United States and China, reciprocal tariff rates temporarily shot up to prohibitive levels. Recently, the average effective tariff rate of the United States for all trading partners was more than 13 percentage points higher than at the start of the year, putting it at its highest level since the 1930s. Many trading partners of the United States are being threatened with further tariff hikes from July onwards in the event of negotiations to reshape bilateral trade relations failing. It is already apparent that the new tariffs and the ongoing trade policy uncertainty are proving an increasing drag on the global economy. According to business surveys, business expectations have deteriorated significantly over the last few months not only in the manufacturing sector but also in services.
Economic output in Germany is likely to have increased slightly in the first quarter of 2025, but could suffer a setback in the second quarter. In the first quarter of 2025, real gross domestic product (GDP) is likely to have risen slightly after seasonal adjustment, following a decline in the previous quarter. This is suggested by the recent increase in industrial and construction output. Service providers are also likely to have expanded their activity somewhat, possibly buoyed by slightly higher private consumption. Real sales in the retail trade, for instance, continued to rise in January and February. However, the underlying cyclical trend remains weak overall. While demand in the construction industry has already recovered from a very depressed level, domestic and foreign demand for German industrial products has remained sluggish. Low capacity utilisation in industry is weighing on firms’ propensity to invest. The labour market is weakening and dampening consumer sentiment. In March, there were positive signals from business sentiment. The ifo business climate index rose markedly and on a broad front. Business expectations, in particular, brightened. In addition, the S&P Global Purchasing Managers’ Index for March was above the expansion threshold in both the services and manufacturing sectors. However, the much more expansionary future fiscal policy stance, which is on the cards following the amendments to Germany’s Basic Law, is likely to have been a major factor in this. Yet a certain time lag is expected before fiscal policy has any major supporting effect on economic output. In the short term, meanwhile, there is a risk of additional headwind for the export industry as a result of US tariff policy. The recent developments and the resulting strong responses in the financial markets were not yet reflected in the March sentiment indicators. The S&P Global Purchasing Managers’ Index fell markedly in April. From today’s perspective, economic output is expected, overall, to decline again in the second quarter.
The German economy is likely to pick up slightly in the first quarter of 2025. Both industry and construction increased output in January, with one-off effects likely to have played a significant part. The rise in industrial output followed a weak year-end. The timing of the December public holidays in conjunction with weak industrial activity probably played a role here. In the construction sector, the favourable weather conditions provided a slight boost in January. However, the basic tendency in industry in particular remains weak in the first quarter. For the time being, the slight recovery in foreign demand for German industrial products has not continued at the beginning of the year. This highlights the persistently difficult competitive position. In addition, investment is still currently facing headwinds. The high degree of uncertainty surrounding economic and political conditions is dampening the propensity to invest, and low industrial capacity utilisation is weighing on investment. Private consumption did not provide any stimulus to growth at the beginning of the year. Consumers were unsettled by the cooling labour market and concerns about job losses, amongst other things. They were reluctant to make use of the additional scope for spending on consumption that had been created last year by the sharp rise in wages. The services sector as a whole, however, is likely to make a slightly positive contribution to growth in the first quarter, even without impetus from private consumption. Overall, economic output is thus likely to increase slightly in the first quarter, although the underlying cyclical trend remains weak.
The future outlook for the German economy is particularly uncertain at present. Compared with expectations from the last Forecast for Germany, the restrictive and uncertain trade policy of the United States could dampen exports more strongly, especially if more extensive tariffs against the EU were to be implemented. At the same time, the considerably more expansionary stance of German fiscal policy, which was envisaged in the results of the preliminary coalition talks of the parties negotiating the formation of a new government, could give a stronger boost to economic output in the coming years.
The global economy expanded moderately again in the final quarter of 2024. This expansion varied across regions. Economic activity remained buoyant in the United States, and in China it strengthened somewhat due to government stimulus measures and strong exports. By contrast, economic output in the euro area rose only slightly. This was also due to the elimination of one-off effects that had supported growth in the third quarter, such as the Olympic Games in Paris.
The regional dichotomy in industrial activity also continued in the fourth quarter. Globally, industrial output is likely to have expanded quite substantially in the final quarter of 2024. However, output growth continued to be driven primarily by emerging market economies. In the advanced economies, industrial activity remained weak. Exports of goods also only picked up in the group of emerging market economies. Expectations of higher US import tariffs probably contributed here.
The tighter US trade policy stance could weigh heavily on world trade and global activity. Newly elected US President Trump intensified his tariff threats against Canada and Mexico, the United States’ main trading partners. US import tariffs on China have already been raised, although so far not nearly by as much as was promised before the presidential election. Recently, the US administration has also adopted additional tariffs on all imports of steel and aluminium and announced broad-based tariff increases against many of its trade partners. Actions of this kind could provoke retaliatory measures from affected countries. Should that occur, the United States has announced that it will respond with further tariff steps. This could lead to serious trade conflicts. Against this backdrop, trade policy uncertainty rose considerably worldwide. The heightened uncertainty alone could already be dampening global economic activity.
Based on an initial and very early estimate released by the Federal Statistical Office, real GDP declined by 0.1% in seasonally adjusted terms. Industry is again likely to have remained particularly weak, being under high pressure to adapt to changing structural conditions. Foreign orders remained very sluggish despite some degree of recovery. The ifo Institute’s business climate index deteriorated again. The construction sector is unlikely to have provided much growth stimulus. A more favourable development in civil engineering is still being offset by the decline in building construction. By contrast, private consumption and the related services sectors are likely to have provided positive impetus. The steep rise in wages provided scope for additional consumer spending. However, consumers remained unsettled and this prevented a stronger recovery in consumption. It is also unlikely that the German economy will manage to escape the prolonged period of stagnation in the first quarter of 2025.
Economic output in Germany declined in 2024 as a whole. According to preliminary calculations by the Federal Statistical Office, real GDP fell by 0.2% on the previous year (and also by 0.2% after calendar adjustment). High financing costs, heightened economic policy uncertainty and the severe capacity underutilisation weighed on investment. The reduced competitiveness of German industry and high competitive pressure, especially from China, were reflected in dwindling exports. Households held back on spending despite sharply rising wages. As a result, their saving rate rose while private consumption increased only slightly.
The German economy is not only struggling with persistent economic headwinds, but is also having to adapt to changing structural conditions. This is affecting the industrial sector in particular, putting a strain on its export business and investments. The labour market, too, is now responding noticeably to the protracted weakness of economic activity. This is dampening private consumption. Against this backdrop, the German economy is set to stagnate in the winter half-year 2024‑25 and only begins to make a slow recovery over the course of 2025. Exports then gradually benefit from the growing sales markets, albeit to a lesser extent than used to be the case. After some delay, business investment also goes back up on the back of rising capacity utilisation and lower financing costs. Private consumption rises consistently, but is initially noticeably slowed by a temporary weakening of the labour market and a significant decline in wage growth.
Calendar-adjusted real GDP falls again slightly in 2024, by 0.2 %, then grows by 0.2 % in 2025, 0.8 % in 2026 and 0.9 % in 2027. The growth outlook is thus revised sharply downwards relative to the June 2024 Forecast for Germany over the entire forecast horizon. This is primarily due to the more persistent weakness in the industrial sector, which is, in addition, largely considered to be structural now, and the consequently significantly gloomier outlook for exports and business investment. Private consumption is also less dynamic, no longer acting as an independent driver of the expected recovery.
The global economy remained on a moderate growth path in the third quarter of 2024. The United States was yet again its main pillar. Its gross domestic product (GDP) rose significantly in the third quarter, too, after price and seasonal adjustment. On the other hand, Chinese economic activity was once again anaemic, not least because of the ongoing real estate market crisis. Economic output in the euro area increased markedly, mainly due to one-off effects.
The recent improvement in industry is unlikely to last. As in the second quarter, global industrial output rose perceptibly in the summer months, too. The economies of Asia, which are highly integrated into international value chains, were a significant factor in this. Global trade in goods expanded even more buoyantly. However, frontloading effects appear to have been playing a role in this. In the previous quarter, companies had already restocked their inventories in anticipation of possible trade policy frictions and the threat of disruptions to shipping. It thus remains to be seen whether the recent upswing will prove sustainable. This is also shown by recent purchasing managers’ surveys, according to which output growth in the manufacturing sector globally came to a standstill as of late and order books have continued to shrink. Political demands for new tariff barriers pose considerable additional risks to international trade.
At its meeting on 30 October 2025, the Governing Council decided to keep the three key ECB interest rates unchanged. Inflation remains close to the 2% medium-term target and the Governing Council’s assessment of the inflation outlook is broadly unchanged. The economy has continued to grow despite the challenging global environment. The robust labour market, solid private sector balance sheets and the Governing Council’s past interest rate cuts remain important sources of resilience. However, the outlook is still uncertain, owing particularly to ongoing global trade disputes and geopolitical tensions.
The Governing Council is determined to ensure that inflation stabilises at its 2% target in the medium term. It will follow a data-dependent and meeting-by-meeting approach to determining the appropriate monetary policy stance. In particular, the Governing Council’s interest rate decisions will be based on its assessment of the inflation outlook and the risks surrounding it, in light of the incoming economic and financial data, as well as the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission. The Governing Council is not pre-committing to a particular rate path.
At its meeting on 11 September 2025, the Governing Council decided to keep the three key ECB interest rates unchanged. Inflation is currently at around the 2% medium-term target and the Governing Council’s assessment of the inflation outlook is broadly unchanged.
The September 2025 ECB staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area present a picture of inflation similar to that projected in June. They see headline inflation averaging 2.1% in 2025, 1.7% in 2026 and 1.9% in 2027. For inflation excluding energy and food, they expect an average of 2.4% in 2025, 1.9% in 2026 and 1.8% in 2027. The economy is projected to grow by 1.2% in 2025, revised up from the 0.9% expected in June. The growth projection for 2026 is now slightly lower, at 1.0%, while the projection for 2027 is unchanged at 1.3%.
The Governing Council is determined to ensure that inflation stabilises at its 2% target in the medium term. It will follow a data-dependent and meeting-by-meeting approach to determining the appropriate monetary policy stance. In particular, the Governing Council’s interest rate decisions will be based on its assessment of the inflation outlook and the risks surrounding it, in light of the incoming economic and financial data, as well as the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission. The Governing Council is not pre-committing to a particular rate path.
At its meeting on 24 July 2025, the Governing Council decided to keep the three key ECB interest rates unchanged. Inflation is currently at the 2% medium-term target. The incoming information is broadly in line with the Governing Council’s previous assessment of the inflation outlook. Domestic price pressures have continued to ease, with wages growing more slowly. Partly reflecting the Governing Council’s past interest rate cuts, the economy has so far proven resilient overall in a challenging global environment. At the same time, the environment remains exceptionally uncertain, especially because of trade disputes.
The Governing Council is determined to ensure that inflation stabilises at its 2% target in the medium term. It will follow a data-dependent and meeting-by-meeting approach to determining the appropriate monetary policy stance. In particular, the Governing Council’s interest rate decisions will be based on its assessment of the inflation outlook and the risks surrounding it, in light of the incoming economic and financial data, as well as the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission. The Governing Council is not pre-committing to a particular rate path.
At its meeting on 5 June 2025, the Governing Council decided to lower the three key ECB interest rates by 25 basis points. In particular, the decision to lower the deposit facility rate – the rate through which the Governing Council steers the monetary policy stance – was based on its updated assessment of the inflation outlook, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission.
Inflation is currently at around the Governing Council’s 2% medium-term target. In the baseline of the June 2025 Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, headline inflation is set to average 2.0% in 2025, 1.6% in 2026 and 2.0% in 2027. The downward revisions compared with the March 2025 ECB staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, by 0.3 percentage points for both 2025 and 2026, mainly reflect lower assumptions for energy prices and a stronger euro. Staff expect inflation excluding energy and food to average 2.4% in 2025 and 1.9% in 2026 and 2027, broadly unchanged since March.
Staff see real GDP growth averaging 0.9% in 2025, 1.1% in 2026 and 1.3% in 2027. The unrevised growth projection for 2025 reflects a stronger than expected first quarter combined with weaker prospects for the remainder of the year. While the uncertainty surrounding trade policies is expected to weigh on business investment and exports, especially in the short term, rising government investment in defence and infrastructure will increasingly support growth over the medium term. Higher real incomes and a robust labour market will allow households to spend more. Together with more favourable financing conditions, this should make the economy more resilient to global shocks.
At its meeting on 17 April 2025, the Governing Council decided to lower the three key ECB interest rates by 25 basis points. In particular, the decision to lower the deposit facility rate – the rate through which the Governing Council steers the monetary policy stance – was based on its updated assessment of the inflation outlook, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission.
The disinflation process is well on track. Inflation has continued to develop as staff expected, with both headline and core inflation declining in March. Services inflation has also eased markedly over recent months. Most measures of underlying inflation suggest that inflation will settle at around the Governing Council’s 2% medium-term target on a sustained basis. Wage growth is moderating, and profits are partially buffering the impact of still elevated wage growth on inflation. The euro area economy has been building up some resilience against global shocks, but the outlook for growth has deteriorated owing to rising trade tensions. Increased uncertainty is likely to reduce confidence among households and firms, and the adverse and volatile market response to the trade tensions is likely to have a tightening impact on financing conditions. These factors may further weigh on the economic outlook for the euro area.
The Governing Council is determined to ensure that inflation stabilises sustainably at its 2% medium-term target. Especially in current conditions of exceptional uncertainty, it will follow a data-dependent and meeting-by-meeting approach to determining the appropriate monetary policy stance. In particular, the Governing Council’s interest rate decisions will be based on its assessment of the inflation outlook in light of the incoming economic and financial data, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission. The Governing Council is not pre-committing to a particular rate path.
At its meeting on 6 March 2025, the Governing Council decided to lower the three key ECB interest rates by 25 basis points. In particular, the decision to lower the deposit facility rate – the rate through which the Governing Council steers the monetary policy stance – is based on its updated assessment of the inflation outlook, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission.
The disinflation process is well on track. Inflation has continued to develop broadly as staff expected, and the March 2025 ECB staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area closely align with the previous inflation outlook. Staff now see headline inflation averaging 2.3% in 2025, 1.9% in 2026 and 2.0% in 2027. The upward revision in headline inflation for 2025 reflects stronger energy price dynamics. For inflation excluding energy and food, staff project an average of 2.2% in 2025, 2.0% in 2026 and 1.9% in 2027.
Most measures of underlying inflation suggest that inflation will settle at around the Governing Council’s 2% medium-term target on a sustained basis. Domestic inflation remains high, mostly because wages and prices in certain sectors are still adjusting to the past inflation surge with a substantial delay. But wage growth is moderating as expected, and profits are partially buffering the impact on inflation.
At its meeting on 30 January 2025, the Governing Council decided to lower the three key ECB interest rates by 25 basis points. In particular, the decision to lower the deposit facility rate – the rate through which the Governing Council steers the monetary policy stance – is based on its updated assessment of the inflation outlook, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission.
The disinflation process is well on track. Inflation has continued to develop broadly in line with the December 2024 Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area and is set to return to the Governing Council’s 2% medium-term target in the course of 2025. Most measures of underlying inflation suggest that inflation will settle at around the target on a sustained basis. Domestic inflation remains high, mostly because wages and prices in certain sectors are still adjusting to the past inflation surge with a substantial delay. But wage growth is moderating as expected, and profits are partially buffering the impact on inflation.
At its meeting on 12 December 2024, the Governing Council decided to lower the three key ECB interest rates by 25 basis points. In particular, the decision to lower the deposit facility rate – the rate through which the Governing Council steers the monetary policy stance – was based on its updated assessment of the inflation outlook, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission.
The disinflation process is well on track. According to the December 2024 Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, headline inflation is expected to average 2.4% in 2024, 2.1% in 2025, 1.9% in 2026 and 2.1% in 2027 when the expanded EU Emissions Trading System becomes operational. For inflation excluding energy and food, staff project an average of 2.9% in 2024, 2.3% in 2025 and 1.9% in both 2026 and 2027.
Most measures of underlying inflation suggest that inflation will settle at around the Governing Council’s 2% medium-term target on a sustained basis. Domestic inflation has edged down but remains high, mostly because wages and prices in certain sectors are still adjusting to the past inflation surge with a substantial delay.
At its meeting on 17 October 2024, the Governing Council decided to lower the three key ECB interest rates by 25 basis points. In particular, the decision to lower the deposit facility rate – the rate through which the Governing Council steers the monetary policy stance – was based on its updated assessment of the inflation outlook, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission. The incoming information on inflation showed that the disinflationary process is well on track. The inflation outlook was also affected by recent downside surprises in indicators of economic activity. Meanwhile, financing conditions remained restrictive.
Inflation is expected to rise in the coming months, before declining to target in the course of next year. Domestic inflation remains high, as wages are still rising at an elevated pace. At the same time, labour cost pressures are set to continue easing gradually, with profits partially buffering their impact on inflation.
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